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Truth Objectivity And Agreement

Posted on 13 Apr 2021 by Kay

[72] See Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61; (2001) 53 NSWLR 153. In this strange case, the question was whether a contract to manage a waste treatment plant regulated the royalties for liquid waste. Heydon JA (with whom Mason P and Ipp AJA agreed) felt that this was the case because the concept of “general commercial waste” in the treaty was objective and concerned liquid waste. The compelling evidence that the parties are in fact defending the contrary intent has been dismissed as irrelevant and inadmissible. These include pre-contract practices (the parties had reached an agreement on higher royalties for liquid waste a few months before the contract), post-treaty conduct consistent with the treaty, and, above all, the statement by both parties that they understood that the contract did not relate to liquid waste. Heydon JA found that all of this evidence “is irrelevant in the absence of an argument that an amending decree should be ordered or that an agreement should be reached by convention” (164, [27]). Ipp AJA`s judgment was even more remarkable for today`s purposes. He accepted the honour that the parties did not provide for the contract to regulate toll waste (194 [151]), but said they were false, which the contract actually provided for. (193 [147]). Moreover, his judgment seems inconsistent internally. In considering a separate issue concerning the interpretation of a purported subsequent agreement between the parties, he acknowledged that, although the contract was clear (192 [140]), “common convictions of the parties on their respective rights, as they existed immediately prior to the conclusion of the contract, are accepted, these beliefs being common assumptions” (191 [139]). See also Andrew Robertson, “On the Distinction between Contract and Tort” in Andrew Robertson (ed), The Law of Bonds: Connections and Boundaries (2004) ch 6, 95-97. There are, however, other uses of objectivity-related terminology.

Many philosophers use the term “subjective knowledge” to refer only to knowledge of their own subjective states. This knowledge is different from knowledge of another individual`s subjective states and from the knowledge of objective reality that would be both an objective knowledge according to existing definitions. Your knowledge of another person`s subjective states can be characterized as objective knowledge, as it is probably part of the world that is “rich in objects” for you, just as you and your subjective states are part of the world that is “object” to the other person. Philosophical theories about the nature of morality are generally divided into assertions that moral truths express subjective states and affirmations, that moral truths express objective facts, by analogy with the fact that the sun is more massive than the Earth. Platonic idealism is a form of metaphysical objectivism that assumes that ideas exist independently of the individual. Berkeley`s empirical idealism, on the other hand, says that things exist only as they are perceived. Both approaches pride themselves on an attempt at objectivity. Plato`s definition of objectivity is found in his theory of knowledge, based on mathematics, and in his metaphysics, where knowledge of the ontological status of objects and ideas is resistant to change. [2] In response to Locke`s thinking, Immanuel Kant used the term “thing in itself” (the “Ding-in-itself”) to refer to pure objectivity.

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